Deepwater Horizon and to report "what, if any, additional precautions and technologies should be required to improve the safety of oil and gas exploration and production operations on the outer continental shelf." 6 Secretary Salazar issued his findings on May 6, 2010, stating, "as a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill . . . no applications for drilling permits [would] go forward for any new offshore drilling activity." 7 The Secretary's report ultimately recommended a six month moratorium on all drilling activity, either present or pending, in the Gulf of Mexico. 8 In its simplest form, a moratorium is "a 'suspension of activity. '" 9 For example, if a road is closed, the ramifications of such a closure could qualify as a moratorium on driving. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, the moratorium consisted of a few phases. Immediately following the blowout, the Coast Guard and NOAA closed fishing sites, 10 altered and closed navigation and aviation areas, and instructed people to avoid the disaster area. 11 The Coast Guard's preventative measures continued until May 2011. 12 As such, each phase of the moratorium following the Deepwater Horizon disaster requires a factintensive inquiry into causation and damages. 13 Two of these inquiries at issue in the B1 bundle 14 litigation were the moratorium and the 13. The plaintiffs, defendants, and the court agreed that this inquiry would be extremely fact intensive. In his opinion dismissing BP's motion for summary judgement on the B1 Bundle claims, Judge Barbier noted: "The parties acknowledge that these claims are fact specific and present a more attenuated causation analysis than the other claims for economic loss, and they compare and contrast the instant Moratorium claims and VoO claims with the facts in the few cases that have been decided" and later " [t] he Court need not define causation under OPA-necessarily a highly factual analysis-at this stage of the pleadings. The Court is satisfied that the VoO and Moratorium Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to state plausible claims in the B1 bundle." In re "Deepwater Horizon", 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 965-66 (E.D. La. 2011) (emphasis added). Despite this agreement, the court's ruling dismissing the moratorium claims did not contain a factual analysis regarding the specifics of these claims and even stated that it would not delve into the causation argument. See generally In re "Deepwater Horizon", 168 F. Supp. 3d at 908.
14. Given the vast quantity of claims, the MDL was organized into pleading bundles based
Despite the fact that the Moratorium was not maintained for the entire six month period, many companies-both drilling companies and those that serve them-suffered lost profits as the permitting process was halted and then delayed, sometimes up to a year, until the MMS began processing applications again. 22 These companies sued as part of the BP/Deepwater Horizon Multidistrict Litigation (MDL). They were members of the B1 pleading bundle, which contained "all claims for private or non-governmental economic loss and property damages." 23 of Louisiana held that the Moratorium losses did not fall within the scope of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), and as such, that these companies could not recover. 24 I respectfully disagree with the court and believe that such a reading is overly narrow and contrary to the purpose and design of OPA.
Though the court did not specifically address the causation standard under OPA, it did so implicitly by analyzing the wording of the statute and excluding economic damages arising from the Moratorium. 25 In fact, it stated that " [t] he Court makes clear that it need not and does not decide whether or not § 2702(a) and/or § 2702(b)(2)(E) incorporates a proximate causation standard, etc." 26 Despite that statement, the court included a two-step proximate causation standard in its analysis. OPA is a strict liability statute designed to restore property and natural resources to pre-incident baselines and to compensate public and private parties for losses that they incurred, whether they involve actual property damage or purely economic damages. 27 The sections at issue read as follows:
A. § 2702(a):
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters … is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that results from such incident.
B. § 2702(b)(2)(E):
Profits and earning capacity -Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant. 28 As discussed herein, the court incorrectly interpreted the "result from" and "due to" language when deciding whether or not the Moratorium stemmed from the Deepwater Horizon spill. It also relied 24 . The OPA issue was litigated and lost by counsel for the private parties to the MDL. At that point, the states and federal government, whose claims were proceeding as part of a separate Bundle, had settled their claims with BP and thus did not litigate this issue with respect to their claims.
25. 29 which, although it involved claims brought under OPA, was not a true OPA case as it did not involve an oil spill. 30 If OPA is read in the manner Congress intended, Moratorium claims should be recoverable as they fall within the class of damages contemplated by § 2702(b)(2)(E) and are consistent with Congress' broad purpose of deterring oil spills by the specter of strict liability for virtually unlimited damages.
There can be little doubt that a temporary moratorium would result from the worst oil spill in history. This point is noted in BP's own pre-accident risk assessment documents, which stated that a catastrophic disaster would jeopardize all drilling activities and likely merit legislative change. 31 Regardless of BP's analysis, foreseeability is not a requirement of a strict liability statute. 32 OPA, premised on the principle that the polluter pays, is designed to hold all polluters strictly liable for pollution events. 33 There are three limited exceptions to this rule, 34 none of which includes foreseeability, superseding cause, or the (2011) (stating that under the strict liability imposed by OPA defendants can assert only a few narrow defenses, which do not include lack of foreseeability).
33. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operative Development (OECD) defines the "Polluter Pays Principle." It states that "[t]he principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called 'Polluter-Pays Principle.' This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and services that cause pollution in production and/or consumption. 128, 1972 WL 24710) . OPA has adopted this through its strict liability regime designed to make the responsible party rather than the public pay to clean up oil spills and reimburse costs of the government and private parties that were harmed by the spill.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). These exceptions include an act of god, an act of war, or an assignment of partial blame to another party (the three exceptions set forth by BP).
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OPA's construction as a strict liability statute, its polluter pays policy, and limited liability exceptions all indicate that its causation standard is as unique as the oil spills that it is designed to address.
The causation standard has been a point of contention among courts interpreting OPA since its adoption in 1990. Because OPA does not use traditional common law terms in its liability provisions, courts have had difficulty interpreting the phrases "result from" and "due to" without applying traditional maritime and common law structures.
36
Despite the desire to conform to traditional notions of tort law, it is important to read statutes in a manner consistent with Congressional intent. Generally, there is disagreement regarding whether or not Congress intended a proximate causation standard for evaluating OPA damage claims. 37 While the proximate causation standard is used in OPA, it is contained in the section dedicated to limiting liability.
38
Section 2704(c)(1) states that limited liability can be excluded if it can be shown that "the incident was proximately caused by" gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the responsible party. 39 Legal canon holds that " [w] here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." 40 Thus, it follows that the liability provisions of OPA do not include a proximate cause standard. Using the Moratorium claims as an example, this article aims to parse the meaning of the phrases "result from" and "due to" in order to show that, although OPA's causation standard likely lies somewhere between proximate cause and but-for causation, a but-for standard more closely aligns with OPA's purpose. 45 The third party contractors argued that because their contract with the ship's owner specified that the ship be docked for repairs every six months, the contract between the ship's owner and Robins was made for the third party's benefit, and therefore it could recover its economic damages under the contract. 46 The Supreme Court rejected this argument "finding that a party to a contract who commits a tort cannot be held liable in damages to an unknown third person that has an interest in the damaged property of another person." 47 As such, the Supreme Court adopted the Robins Dry Dock rule ("Robins rule"): a bright line rule stipulating that there is no cause of action for purely economic damages without physical injury to a proprietary interest. Then, in 1985, a bulk carrier and a container ship collided in the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), causing a chemical spill. 49 As such, the MRGO had to be closed, resulting in economic losses to many claimants, including those with shipping interests and fishermen who were unable to access or utilize the MRGO for the duration of the two week closure. 50 In State of Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V TESTBANK, the District Court upheld the Robins rule as it applied to those with shipping interests but expanded the scope of recovery to include the fishermen that were unable to access fish. 51 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit expanded the Robins rule by allowing commercial fishermen to recover purely economic damages; the court noted that Union Oil Co. v. Oppen
52
-which the plaintiffs cited as abolishing the Robins ruleactually "pointed out that the fishermen's losses were foreseeable and direct consequences of the spill," which creates a limited exception to the rule. 53 In fact, the Union Oil court expressly declined to "open the door to claims that may be asserted by…other[s]…whose economic or personal affairs were discommoded by the oil spill." 54 As such, the TESTBANK rule merely expanded the Robins rule to include commercial fishermen. All other would-be plaintiffs would still need to prove physical damage to a proprietary interest in order to recover economic damages. 
A. § 2702(a):
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters…is liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that results from such incident. 
B. § 2702(b)(2)(E):
Profits and earning capacity -Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.
63
The emphasized phrases are those that give courts pause when determining the proper causation standard in OPA cases. None of the above falls neatly within traditional maritime or tort causation standards and, as such, there is much argument about the extent to which they adhere to traditional liability standards and how far they deviate from the same.
First, it is prudent to highlight what Congress has said regarding the "result from" and "due to" language found respectively in § 2702(a) and § 2702(b)(2)(E): "Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any claimant may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from [the statutory term is "due to"] injury to property or natural resources."
64 Professor Robertson points out that this is "an authoritative indication by Congress that the Section 2702(b)(2)(E) term 'due to' has the same meaning as the Section 2702(a) term 'result from.'" 65 Congress' concise statement on the matter unequivocally contradicts the argument that the "due to" standard places an additional causation burden on those claiming purely economic damages. 65. Robertson, supra note 41, at 168. 66. Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Kenneth Feinberg was placed at the helm of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, the purpose of which was to settle claims for economic losses against BP. Feinberg requested that Professor John C.P. Goldberg of Harvard write a memo discussing the meaning of § 2702(b)(2)(E) so that Feinberg will be able to discern which claims fall under the scope of OPA and which do not. Notably, Feinberg was not independent of BP and as such some believe was seeking to limit as many claims as possible. Professor Goldberg posited that this particular section added a commercial use right requirement as the "due to" added another layer of proof. The professor states that "[t]his statutory language is best understood to allow recovery only by those economic loss claimants who can prove that they have suffered economic loss because a spill has damaged, destroyed, or otherwise rendered physically unavailable to them property or resources that they have a right to put to commercial use." . 1985) ). Under such a proposition claimants would have to show that the natural resource was injured, that they suffered economic loss, and that they would have been able to put that natural resource to commercial use, such as through fishing.
Since Congress intended the "due to" and "result from" language to be synonymous, it is important to reemphasize that " [w] here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." 67 Many responsible parties have attempted to interpret § 2702(b)(2)(E) as somehow including a proximate cause, use right, or similarly restrictive standard. Upon a proper reading, such restrictions do not exist because the "due to" language found in section (E) is intended to mirror the "result from" language of § 2702(a). 68 In order to understand these distinctions, § 2702(b) provides a list of the classes of claimants and the prerequisites for each to recover. 69 Importantly, § 2702(b)(2)(C) includes a use standard that directly addresses the use of natural resource for subsistence while section (E) does not. Section 2702(b)(2)(C) directly addresses those that use natural resources for subsistence use. 70 Damages are recoverable by "any claimant who so uses natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without regard to the ownership or management of the resources." 71 The mere existence of this section refutes Professor Goldberg's contention that section (E) is only intended for those who use the injured natural resource for economic gain, such as commercial fishermen. 72 Further, this section requires a claimant to show that the natural resource has been damaged, whereas in section (E) the claimants' losses need only be due to (i.e. result from) the injury. 73 If the proper statutory interpretation canon is applied, Congress' decision to leave such a use-right out of section (E) indicates that they intended for the section to cover more claimants than just those who subsist off natural resources. Congress would not have included (E) as superfluous language if it had meant for it to follow the same standard 72. Professor Goldberg concludes in his memo that proper interpretation of § 2702(b)(2)(E) holds that "if a spill were to deprive commercial fishermen of expected profits by killing fish they ordinarily would catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar the fishermen from accessing those fish for a period of time, the fishermen would be entitled to recover. By contrast, operators of beach resorts in areas physically unaffected by a spill, but that nonetheless suffer economic loss because of a general downturn in tourism resulting from the spill, are among those who are not entitled to recovery under OPA."
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
set forth in (C). 74 While such a use-right standard should not be read into the statute, it is highly important that the words in the statute are given their proper statutory meaning and context.
Much of the responsible parties' apparent confusion comes from their failure to read § 2702(a) completely. It states that a responsible party is liable for injuries that "result from such incident." 75 It is imperative that the proper emphasis is placed on the "incident" itself, rather than on the discharge of oil. In the BP litigation, Transocean argued that "incident" in § 2702(a) is synonymous with "the discharge or threatened discharge of oil," 76 when in fact the statute defines "incident" as "any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil"." 77 This means that the events leading up to the discharge of oil, rather than the discharge itself, constitute the incident. For example, damages from governmental decisions to halt fishing would constitute part of the incident and not the risk of contact between the fish and oil. Liability attaches to the incident under § 2702(a), which holds that the responsible party is "liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section that result from such incident."
78 As such, the economic damages, including the Moratorium losses that fall under § 2702(b)(2)(E), would simply have to arise from the incident. Since claimants need not show a use-right and the "due to" language is equivalent to the "result from" language, claimants under section (E) need only show that their injuries resulted from the incident that caused injury or destruction to personal property or natural resources.
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Some sections, however, do require that a certain class of claimant's injuries be caused directly by the discharge of oil. Notably, § 2702(b)(2)(F) requires that the specified damages be "caused by a discharge of oil," which is conspicuously absent in section (E). logical for section (F) to contain such a requirement because it pertains to increased public services to protect the public from safety hazards (i.e. an oil spill). 81 Once again, Congress would have included "caused by" language if it wished to limit economic damages to those directly impacted by the discharge of oil rather than the incident. "Caused by" language often has a proximate causation connotation, which, once again, is not included in § 2702(b)(2)(E).
As noted previously, Congress did in fact include proximate cause language in other parts of the statute. For example, § 2704 details the limits on responsible party liability. Responsible parties are generally not subject to unlimited liability unless it is shown that the incident was caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct.
82 Importantly, the standard for proving such gross negligence or willful misconduct is proximate causation.
83 Section 2704 (c) states: "Subsection (a) [limits on liability] of this section does not apply if the incident was proximately caused by …" 84 This is yet another example of Congress using language in one section and omitting it in another, which illustrates its intent to apply a different standard. 85 Further supporting the fact that it did not intend for the liability section to follow such a standard, it was included in OPA's predecessor legislation, as well as early iterations of the statute, but left out in the final adopted version.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) preceded OPA as a remedial statute for oil spills. 86 The adoption of OPA repealed much of this legislation, including the portions containing a proximate causation standard. Title III of the OSCLA Amendments of 1978 provided for the recovery of damages that were "proximately caused by the discharge of oil from an offshore facility or vessel." 87 OPA replaced this provision with 2702(a). 88 Because Congress intended to eliminate the proximate cause requirement, such a standard should not be read into OPA's liability provision. Furthermore, Title III of the OSCLA Amendments of 1978 contained a use-right provision that was similarly left out of OPA. 89 It authorized the recovery of pollutioncaused economic damages "due to injury to, or destruction of, real or personal property or natural resources…if the claimant derives at least 25 per centum of his earnings from activities which utilize the property or natural resource."
90 OPA repealed and replaced this provision with § 2702(b)(2)(E), which plainly does not contain such a use-right restriction.
91 Finally, and fatally for any argument that Congress intended for a proximate cause or use right standard to be read into OPA, the first drafts of OPA did contain such provisions, but these provisions were removed before the Act was adopted in 1990.
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Proximate cause and use rights were in the first iterations of OPA but were removed prior to its final adoption. 93 Early versions of the Act included both a direct causation standard as well as a proximate cause standard. 94 One version sought to limit recoverable damages to those "which are proximately cause [d] by" 95 the spill or threat of spill, while others attempted to limit damages to those "that arise out of or directly result from" 96 a spill or threat of a spill, or those "that arise out of or directly result from such discharge or threat of discharge." 97 As to the use-right, three of the preliminary bills introduced in Congress included such a limitation in their economic loss sections. 98 However, as the bills made their way through the legislative process, that language was deleted. 99 102 we should look first to the basic meaning of "result from." The plain English meaning of "result" means "to proceed or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion" and "from" "indicate[s] the source, cause, agent or basis."
103 Stated another way, "result from" means the cause without which the event would not have occurred, i.e. "but for," which means that responsible parties are liable for damages and removal costs that would not have accrued "but for" the incident. Such an interpretation is congruent with Congress' intention to expand the classes of claimants that can recover following an oil spill. When read with this broad nexus standard, OPA clearly allows for the recovery of Moratorium damages. Case law supports such a broad interpretation, and those cases that read the statute narrowly were decided contrary to clearly expressed Congressional intent. Strict joint and several liability prevents a responsible party from forcing the plaintiff to apportion the damage between all responsible parties. According to E. Donald Elliot and Mary Beth Houlihan, this feature is imperative for swift delivery of compensation. They note the following:
The idea was that 'finger-pointing' among the companies involved should not delay either the clean-up or paying compensation to the injured. Thus, the term 'responsible party' is really a misnomer; a more accurate term might be the 'initially responsible party,' because a party paying claims in the first instance under OPA90 may seek to hold others ultimately responsible. 104 Those found to be responsible parties may attempt to place the blame on another actor; however, the burden of proof is steep and those parties are unlikely to prevail. Stated another way, liability to victims is easily established, though a more contentious and timeconsuming contribution process may be available in appropriate cases.
First, and importantly, OPA, despite numerous cross references to the CWA in its liability provisions, 105 does not include the same government negligence defense as the CWA. 106 As such, responsible parties are precluded from placing any type of blame on the United States government for its possible negligence. Furthermore, § 2703(a)(3) provides for a defense to liability if the incident was caused by "an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the responsible party or a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible party."
107 Such a defense may be invoked if the responsible party can show that it "exercised due care" and "took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions." 108 The Act goes on to define a contractual relationship, and indicates joint and several liability, stating in § 2703(d)(6): "[n]othing in this paragraph shall affect the liability under this Act of a responsible party who, by any act or omission, caused or contributed to the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil which is the subject of the action relating to the facility." 109 Further still, there is no reference to any failure to mitigate damages on the part of the plaintiff akin to a contributory negligence analysis. 110 Should the responsible party attempt to make such an argument, it would be foreclosed per se by the strict, joint, and several liability imposed by the statute. Under OPA, once a plaintiff has established that an actor is a responsible party such an actor may be held liable for all of the damages, regardless of whether or not other parties are at fault. 111 The burden of proof then shifts to the responsible party to seek contribution from other possible responsible parties or to prove the three affirmative defenses.
112
Congress only provided two other defenses to liability within OPA: an act of God or an act of war.
113 Both of these extreme events added to the already-limited third party defense, making it difficult for a responsible party to evade liability. If a party is responsible in any way, these defenses will not apply. 114 Such narrow defenses to liability indicate that Congress intended for polluters to be held liable in all but a very few instances. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act ("CERCLA") has analogous exceptions to liability. 115 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the court noted that " 111. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012) (stating that "each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable") (emphasis added). requirement makes superfluous the affirmative defenses provided in section 9607(b), each of which carves out from liability an exception based on causation." 116 Importantly, unlike CERCLA, "OPA exonerates the responsible party from liability imposed by [ § 2702 ] if that party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the incident resulted solely from (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party"… ."
117 The addition of "solely" renders OPA's exceptions even more restrictive than CERCLA. It follows then that the interpretation and construction of such exceptions are equal to or greater than those of CERCLA. Given these narrow causational exceptions, a proximate cause standard simply does not make sense in OPA section 2702(a). Because the proximate cause standard does not make sense within the context of OPA's liability provisions, it would follow that any arguments and defenses that traditionally fall within such a causational analysis also fail to comport with OPA.
One such analysis is that of intervening and superseding causes. Under traditional tort theory, if a potential tortfeasor can show that there is an intervening and superseding cause between the time of his action and the injury of the plaintiff, he will escape liability. 118 This includes a foreseeability analysis that is conspicuously absent from OPA's liability provisions. However, because OPA lists three very limited instances in which a responsible party may assert a complete defense, such arguments are inapplicable. The fact that proximate cause is included in other areas, but not in the liability section, 119 means that the statute is based on strict joint and several liability. As such, even if the responsible party could point to some intervening fault of another actor, it would not absolve it of legal liability. If anything, the responsible party would be forced to seek contribution from the intervening actor. 120 Finally, OPA did not include the governmental negligence exception found in the CWA. 121 As such, under OPA, government actions, legal or not, 122 cannot be used as a liability shield. 122. In the Moratorium case, the plaintiffs noted that BP attempted "to claim that the Moratoria, or permitting changes, or other Governmental action was 'unforeseeable' or 'unreasonable' or even 'illegal', thereby breaking the chain of causation as a 'superseding cause Arguably, the most important feature of OPA is its polluter pays policy. This policy is the driver behind strict, joint, and several liability and the limited defenses available to responsible parties. 123 The "polluter pays" principle is based on the simple idea that the polluter, not the public, should internalize the cost of its damage to the environment. 124 In European countries, this policy is implemented through proactive taxes on emissions, maintains the permitting systems, and responds to environmental disasters. 125 In the United States, the polluter pays principle is found in CERCLA, 126 the CWA, 127 and OPA 128 and forces the polluter to pay for removal and restoration costs in the event of a spill. It is evident in CWA's criminal penalties where "'It doesn't require much' to prove a criminal offense after an oil spill. 'It's basically: did BP intend to drill an oil well in the Gulf that resulted in a discharge of oil into waters of the United States?'" 129 OPA's strict, joint, and several liability provides the same backstop: the responsible party is held liable for the pollution unless it can satisfy any of the three narrow exceptions. 130 Congress recognized how financially debilitating strict liability can be and included a limit to liability in § 2704.
131 Taken together, it is clear that Congress intended for the polluter to pay. Such intention manifested itself in the language, liability structures, and defenses it selected. adopted the Coast Guard's narrow interpretation of the liability provisions, blocking Gatlin's recovery from the Federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund ("Fund") and, perhaps, created a loophole for would-be responsible parties. The statute cannot be read both broadly to favor the government and narrowly in response to a responsible party's valid request for reimbursement.
In U.S. v. Conoco, Inc., the Eastern District of Louisiana found that Conoco was liable for the monitoring costs incurred by the United States Coast Guard following two pipeline breaks and subsequent spills into the Gulf of Mexico. 135 Although Conoco successfully removed all of the spilled oil, the Coast Guard undertook various monitoring activities to ensure intervention was not necessary. 136 Such activities included helicopter flyovers, oversight of Conoco's response efforts, and an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incidents. 137 The Coast Guard argued, and the court agreed as follows: "The government is authorized to monitor the cleanup efforts of the responsible party and OPA defines removal as including not only the actual containment or removal of oil but also such other actions as are necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare." 138 The government contended that Coast Guard monitoring was necessary in order to ensure that Conoco's actions were sufficient to Shumagin Islands off the coast of Alaska. 148 Though there was only minor spillage in the form of a 2000-foot long sheen, the carrier had 200,000 gallons of bunker oil in its bottom fuel tanks. 149 This qualified as a threatened major oil spill to which the Coast Guard responded with monitoring operations while Hyundai worked to free the ship and clean up the sheen. 150 The Coast Guard stood by for eleven days while Hyundai performed the actual oil containment and ship freeing. 151 The U.S. sued under OPA and the District Court awarded it $1,702,553.51. 152 Hyundai appealed several aspects of that award, the crux of its argument being that a responsible party that spends millions on a successful cleanup should not have to reimburse the government for duplicative and unnecessary work. 153 Like Conoco, Hyundai attempted to argue that monitoring costs do not constitute removal costs contemplated by the statute. 154 Like Judge Sear, the Ninth Circuit read the relevant OPA provisions to include the removal costs enumerated in § 2702(b) as well as those cross-referenced in the CWA. 155 The court highlighted the definitions of "removal costs," "removal," and "costs of removal."
156 "Removal costs" are defined as "the costs of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or, in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such incident," which clearly notes that prevention measures are covered by the statute. 157 Hyundai argued that the definition of "removal" prevents the government from collecting such costs because it references "actions as may be necessary," which Hyundai argued required that government actions must be necessary. 158 The court, however, noted that such a reading is taken out of context. "Removal" is defined as the following:
[C]ontainment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and beaches. 159 The court noted, "the words 'as may be necessary' do not purport to be a limitation on reimbursement. 160 They are more naturally read as an acknowledgement of executive discretion in determining the steps a particular situation requires," and, regardless, "removal costs," not "removal," was the applicable definition in this case. 161 Finally, Hyundai argued that the Coast Guard's base costs, or those that it would have incurred (such as personnel salaries) whether or not it was responding to the Hyundai emergency, were not covered under OPA's liability section. 162 However, the court found that the Coast Guard's base costs did in fact "result from" the incident. 163 It explained that "[t]he fact that, if this near-disaster had not occurred, the personnel would have been paid to perform some other task does not alter the reality that the mishap did occur and the Coast Guard personnel were paid to monitor a potential spill." 164 The Ninth Circuit read OPA as covering all of the responses that "result from" the incident, in this case, the Hyundai No. 12 running aground. Like Conoco, the Court construed the statute broadly to cover actual response costs and those damages resulting from the underlying "incident" rather than from the oil spill.
In stark contrast with both Conoco and Hyundai's broad readings is Gatlin Oil Co. Inc. v. U.S., 165 where the Fourth Circuit limited the ability of the Gatlin Oil Company to recover costs from the Fund by narrowly construing the statute. Interestingly, Gatlin is the inverse of Conoco and Hyundai, with the private responsible party seeking to recover damages and costs and the Coast Guard denying most of such recovery. On March 13, 1994, a vandal opened fuel storage tanks that were located on Gatlin's property in North Carolina, leading to the discharge of approximately 20,000-30,000 gallons of oil, some of which entered nearby drainage ditches and eventually a navigable river. 166 Vapors from the released oil ignited a fire that burned for several hours, destroying much of Gatlin's property including a warehouse, bulk plant, inventory, loading dock, several vehicles, and consuming most of the discharged fuel. 167 The court held that Gatlin, the State of North Carolina, and the Coast Guard took all of the appropriate response actions. 168 The Federal On-Scene Coordinator determined that 5,500 gallons of oil had reached the surrounding ditches and that 10 gallons had made their way through dikes into a nearby creek that flowed into the North Prong of the Bay River. 169 Gatlin complied with all federal, and later, state clean up directives and, on July 29, 1994, the Federal OnScene Coordinator officially confirmed compliance. 170 Gatlin was entitled to a complete defense given that a vandal released the oil.
171 It was also entitled to recover removal costs and damages from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 172 Gatlin requested $850,000, while the Coast Guard maintained that it was only entitled to $6,959 for the 5,500 gallons in the ditches and the 10 gallons that reached the North Prong. 173 The district court agreed with Gatlin after reviewing the Coast Guard's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA. 174 It remanded the case and the government appealed. 175 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the Coast Guard, limiting Gatlin's recovery to the cleanup costs for the oil that had reached the ditches and navigable water. 176 This holding is entirely too narrow and contrary to the proper reading and intent of the statute.
One commenter noted that such a reading of the statute is, on the surface, "consistent with one of the stated purposes of OPA: increasing the financial responsibility of a polluting party."
177 Importantly, however, Gatlin was a victim as much as the environment and did everything in its power to correct the situation while experiencing significant loss itself. The court in Gatlin wrongly focused on a single word found within § 2702(a): "such."
178 By referring to the discharge of oil, which is the antecedent of "such incident," the Coast Guard interpreted the "results from such incident" language as meaning only that damages resulting from the discharge or threat of discharge of oil into navigable waters are covered. 179 By parsing the language in this way, the Coast Guard interpreted "incident" to mean the actual discharge or threat of discharge of oil, rather than the actual statutory definition that encompasses "any occurrence or series of occurrences."
180 As such, Gatlin could not recover damages for the fire. 181 The court reasoned that the fire did not cause the discharge or threat of discharge of oil, and therefore, such damages did not fall within the Coast Guard's interpretation. 182 This narrow parsing directly contradicts the court in Conoco, which emphasized the statutory cannon articulated in Dole. 183 It further contradicts the holdings in both Conoco and Hyundai, which read the definitions of "incident," "removal," "removal costs," and "result from," broadly in order to allow recovery for the Coast Guard, while here the Coast Guard reads the same provisions as narrowly as possible to deny recovery for Gatlin. Judge Niemeyer's dissent in Gatlin further emphasized a broad interpretation of the statutory definitions, highlighting the fact that Gatlin's fire "damages 'resulted from' the vandals' discharge of oil, a discharge which both polluted navigable waters and immediately threatened to pollute navigable waters." 184 More dangerous still is the possibility of future responsible parties limiting their own liability based on this narrow parsing of "such" and its antecedent. 185 If this decision were to control, responsible parties could argue that, under Gatlin, they are only responsible for the damages caused by the actual oil reaching navigable waters and nothing else. It would likely even limit the ability of the Coast Guard itself to recover monitoring costs as it had in Conoco and Hyundai, since personnel salaries do not cause the discharge or 179. Id. 180. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14) (2012). 181. It is important to note that Gatlin's definition of incident is nonsensical as it contemplates the effect, i.e. the discharge of oil, before the cause, i.e. the vandals opening the drums. In traditional language structure, the effect cannot come before the cause. OPA's definition of "incident" is far clearer than the age old, which came first, the chicken or the egg debate. However, this is precisely the question the court in Gatlin poses, and incorrectly answers. Further still, the facts clearly indicate that the fire was a result of the vapors released by the oil, and as such, the fire is really the only damage caused by the discharge of oil. 
VI. SHUTDOWN CASES
There are several cases when the shutdown of bodies of water caused economic loss that the courts agreed to hear or grant damages. In such cases, authorities (generally the Coast Guard) shut down a waterway after a spill in order to respond to, contain, and cleanup the oil.
187 Those individuals and businesses that are unable to access the water, either as a route to other locations or for economic purposes, have been allowed to bring economic loss claims under § 2702(b)(2)(E). 188 In the dismissal of the BP Moratorium claims, Judge Barbier held that the Moratorium was distinguishable from these cases. 189 This holding, however, reads OPA's liability provision too narrowly. The Moratorium claims are very similar to claims resulting from closure of a river or a bayou and, as such, should be permitted.
In In re Settoon Towing, LLC, the Eastern District of Louisiana allowed claims for economic loss due to the inability to reach a production platform and the mere prospect of litigation arising from the closure of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. 190 The conflict at issue occurred on January 20, 2007, when the M/V CATHY M. SETTOON was pushing a large barge and struck a well owned and operated by ExPert Oil & Gas, LLC in Bayou Perot. 191 Barataria Production Services (BPS), a production company, issued a written demand on ExPert for damages because it was unable to access its production platform during the cleanup process.
192 ExPert, in turn, sought damages from the responsible party, Settoon Towing. 193 Settoon argued that under Robins, ExPert could not allege economic damages for a third party without evidence of physical injury to a proprietary interest.
194
The court disagreed, noting that "OPA legislative history makes it 186 clear that to recover damages under section 2702(b)(2)(E), 'the claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or income. '" 195 As such, the court ruled that ExPert may assert such claims against Settoon and denied Settoon's Motion for Summary Judgement.
196
The court then discussed ExPert's claim for damages for "potential suits seeking economic damages for the shutdown of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway." 197 Despite the fact that no such suits had been brought, the court held that ExPert could maintain such claims. 198 It stated that "[t]he potential suits described by ExPert are similar to the claim made against it by BPS, i.e. claims by other businesses who suffered economic losses because they could not conduct business due to the ICW shutdown." 199 In other words, the court recognized the possibility that a shutdown of a waterway could affect many businesses, and that it is contrary to OPA to limit such claims. Interestingly, the court relied on the erroneous definitions provided by Gatlin Oil, specifically that "the claimant must show that the damage resulted from a discharge or threatened discharge of oil into navigable waters or the adjacent shoreline." 200 OPA is clearly intended to cover damages that result from the incident, not the discharge of oil itself. Despite this fact, shutdown cases still fall within what the court holds as the purview of OPA's liability provisions.
The Western District of Louisiana has similarly held that OPA's liability provisions cover economic damages resulting from waterway shutdowns. In Dunham-Price Group, LLC, et al. v . Citgo Petroleum Corp., the court denied Citgo's motion for summary judgment barring economic damages claims resulting from the closure of 22 miles of the Calcasieu River following a spill from its Lake Charles refinery. 201 Dunham Price owns and operates a concrete facility several miles upriver from Citgo's refinery and the zone closed by the Coast Guard. 202 It alleged that it sustained damages from loss of use, increased expenses, and business interruption resulting from the closure. 203 In its ruling, the court cited the same Taira Lynn rule, also cited in Settoon, that the claimant need not own the damaged property or resources to recover economic losses. 204 The court simply noted that the Calcasieu River meets OPA's definition of a natural resource and that Citgo admitted to negligently discharging 30,000 gallons of oil. 205 For this reason, the court held that Dunham had presented enough evidence for a trier of fact to decide whether the economic damages were a result of the incident. 206 Finally, in a recent case, the Eastern District of Louisiana once again held that economic damages due to shutdowns are appropriate under OPA. 207 On July 23, 2008, the M/V TINTOMARA, an oceangoing tanker, collided with a barge, owned by American Commercial Lines, LLC (ACL), carrying thousands of barrels of oil, resulting in an oil spill in the Mississippi River near New Orleans, Louisiana. 208 The Coast Guard closed 29 miles of the Lower Mississippi River following the spill, reopening it to traffic seven days later on July 30, 2008. 209 The court rejected ACL's assertion that the U.S. could not recover payments made out of the Fund "to a claimant that failed to establish that the loss was caused by the oil spill," particularly those "incurred solely as a result of the Coast Guard's closing of the Mississippi River." 210 The court rejected this contention, noting that: The courts in this circuit have refused to make oiling of physical property a prerequisite for recovery of damages under the OPA; instead, they have found triable issues of fact as to causation when claimants seek damages for loss of business resulting from the closure or loss of use of a natural resource such as a river.
211
ACL relied on Taira Lynn and the Moratorium case at issue in this article as supporting its position that such economic damages are not recoverable under OPA.
212 Taira Lynn, quoted above, is irrelevant, 213 and Deepwater Horizon was wrongly decided. In any event, the court in ACL held that neither case adequately supported ACL's position.
214
It is important to highlight the court's language in describing the natural resource damages. That language, unlike the language in all of the above cases, does not cite Gatlin's incorrect position that there must be damage from the oil; rather, it states that economic loss claims may "result[] from the closure or loss of use of a natural resource such as a river."
215 This points to the incident rather than the direct oiling as suggested in Gatlin. The Moratorium, in essence a very large shutdown, was the direct result of the incident.
VII. THE OIL-LESS OPA CASE
Throughout the Moratorium claims arguments and subsequent decisions both Transocean and Judge Barbier highlight and referenced a Fifth Circuit case as pertaining to OPA causation. 216 In fact, the cited case lacked an actual oil spill, and its limited OPA discussion relied on the wrongly decided Gatlin decision. 217 In Taira Lynn Marie Ltd. No. 5, LLC v. Jays Seafood, Inc. a tug and its tow carrying "a gaseous mixture of propylene/propane" allided with a bridge in St. Mary Parish, Louisiana, releasing the gas into the surrounding area, resulting in a temporary evacuation of the businesses and residences within a designated radius of the bridge. 218 The businesses that were forced to evacuate brought damages claims, including claims for purely economic losses, under general maritime law, CERCLA, OPA, and state law. 219 The district court found that there was a geographical exception to the general rule that purely economic losses were not recoverable without physical damage, thereby allowing claimants with such claims a chance to pursue them in court. 220 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit barred recovery based on the M/V TESTBANK rule, noting that there is no such geographical exception. 221 Further, although it addressed OPA, the court seemed skeptical that the statute even applied and did not address the liability provision § 2702(a) or the "result from" language. 222 When deciding that claimants could not recover under OPA, the court relied on the wrongly decided Gatlin decision. 223 If OPA were to apply, the court should have read the liability provision rather than the Gatlin decision, which would have analyzed the economic losses based on the incident (i.e. the allision, rather than the release of the gas). If gas is synonymous with oil, the claimants should have been able to recover under OPA, because their losses resulted from the allision, the resulting release of gas, and the evacuation.
However, it is not clear that gas is synonymous with oil, and as such, it is not likely that the claims should have even been evaluated under OPA. 224 Further still, the court reluctantly addressed OPA, but relied more heavily on M/V TESTBANK in its decision to dismiss the economic damage claims. 225 As discussed extensively above, OPA replaced the M/V TESTBANK rule in order to allow more claimants to recover from the multifaceted damage of an oil spill. 226 As such, though Taira Lynn states the general proposition that OPA allows for purely economic damages, 227 it is not exemplar OPA case law. The court was hesitant to hold that OPA was applicable and when it did, refrained from discussing both causation and liability. However, OPA is unquestionably applicable in the Moratorium case. When dismissing the Moratorium claims, Judge Barbier relied almost entirely on the Taira Lynn decision even though he recognized that "Taira Lynn does not align perfectly with the cases at hand because the gaseous discharge caused no direct damage to property or resources (whether owned by 222. Id. at 383. The court posits: "Even assuming arguendo that OPA applies, none of the claimants has raised an issue of fact as to whether any property damage was caused by the pollution incident, i.e., the release of the gaseous cargo. A party is liable under OPA if, inter alia, the claimant's damages result from such incident, i.e., the discharge or threatened discharge of oil." See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012) (emphasis added); Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States, 169 F.3d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The Coast Guard has interpreted the Act to provide that only removal costs and damages that 'result from such incident' are compensable.") citing § 2702(a).
223. Taira Lynn, 444 F.3d at 382-83. 224. There is good evidence that a propane/propylene mixture contains hydrogen sulfide, which is listed as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2012). OPA defines oil as "oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil but does not include any substance which is specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 101(14) of [CERCLA] ." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (2012) (emphasis added). When CERCLA is cross referenced, it provides that hazardous substance includes "any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the [CAA] ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(E) (2012). It follows then that the mixture discharged in Taira Lynn is a hazardous substance covered by the CAA and CERCLA and not OPA.
225 the plaintiffs or not), whereas the HORIZON/Macondo spill caused extensive damage to property and resources." 228 If Judge Barbier wished to rely on Taira Lynn despite its tenuous OPA claims, he would, in effect, be relying on the Gatlin decision, and if that were to apply to the HORIZON/Macondo spill, which, as he readily notes caused extensive damage, injuries resulting from such damage would be covered. Those injuries include the Moratorium claims.
VIII. THE MORATORIUM CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE DAMAGES
CONTEMPLATED BY § 2702(B)(2)(E)
On March 10, 2016, Judge Barbier of the Eastern District of Louisiana granted BP's Motion to Dismiss Moratoria/Permitoria Claims, thereby dismissing the economic damage claims brought by members of the oil industry following the Moratorium on drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. 229 To reiterate, Secretary Ken Salazar announced on May 6, 2010 that "as a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill . . . no applications for drilling permits [would] go forward for any new offshore drilling 'activity'" 230 pending his report to the president which was released on May 27 and recommended "(1) a six month moratorium on permits for new wells being drilled using floating rigs and (2) an immediate halt to drilling operations on the 33 permitted wells that [were] currently being drilled using floating rigs in the Gulf of Mexico." 231 The Moratorium was challenged under the APA, resulting in a preliminary injunction forcing the Secretary to reissue a revised Moratorium, which was released on July 12, 2010. 232 Despite the fact that the Moratorium was scheduled to last six months, it was lifted on October 12, 2010. 233 Members of the B1 bundle sued under OPA for the economic damages they suffered as a result of the Moratorium and resultant backlog of permit evaluation at the Marine Management Service, known as the Permitoria. 234 The plaintiffs in question, who make up one of the test cases for the MDL, included a marine salvage and commercial diving business; an offshore platform rig provider; a salvager of offshore production equipment; an oil and 228. In re "Deepwater Horizon", 168 F.Supp.3d 908, 917 (E.D. La. 2016 gas exploration and production company; a drilling services contractor; and a heavy material handling equipment inspection, maintenance, and service company.
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In its opinion, the court notes that BP is liable for damages under § 2702(b)(2)(E) "if, inter alia, the claimant's damages 'result from such incident,' i.e., the discharge or threatened discharge of oil," 236 which is a direct quotation from Taira Lynn. As noted above, Taira Lynn extrapolated this definition from Gatlin, which wrongly construed the definition of incident to mean only the discharge of oil. 237 Both the court and Gatlin have failed to apply the proper statutory cannon to their definition of "incident." Where Congress includes language in one section, but omits it in another, it can be presumed that that omission was intentional.
238 § 2702(b)(2)(F) specifies that its particular damages were "caused by a discharge of oil."
239 If Congress wished § 2702(b)(2)(E) to also be dependent on damage caused by the discharge of oil, it would have explicitly stated such a requirement.
Furthermore, Taira Lynn is a poor example of OPA case law, as it does not deal with the discharge or threatened discharge of oil. Rather, it deals with a gaseous mixture that the Taira Lynn court was not even sure fell within the purview of OPA. 240 Strangely, the Fifth Circuit states that "because the connection between the HORIZON/Macondo incident and the Moratorium is even more attenuated than the gaseous release and mandatory evacuation in Taira Lynn…the court's conclusion here is certainly consistent with Taira Lynn."
241 Again, there is no need to be consistent with a case that barely contains an OPA claim. Moreover, it is hard to see how a case involving the largest oil spill in U.S. history and the resultant closure of the Gulf, that the court readily concedes is due to the spill, is more attenuated than a last-ditch effort to classify a propane/propylene gaseous mixture as oil.
As noted previously, the court relied almost exclusively on Taira Lynn to formulate its opinion. Following its discussion of the definition of liability provided by Taira Lynn, it concludes: "Reading § 2701(a) and § 2702(b)(2)(E) together, Plaintiffs must establish that their economic losses were 'due to' the injury, destruction, or loss of property or natural resources that 'result[ed] from' the discharge or threatened discharge of oil from the HORIZON/Macondo well (i.e., the 'incident')." 242 If the court's interpretation is correct, the plaintiffs would need to prove that the discharge of oil damaged property or natural resources and that such damage caused their economic loss. 243 This echoes Professor Goldberg's two-step use right analysis discussed at length in his highly criticized memo commissioned by Mr. Feinberg. 244 Once again, this wrongly adds a second layer of causational proof to the Plaintiff's burden while continuing to ignore the statutory definition of "incident."
245 As discussed extensively above, congressional intent proves that the "due to" language is the same as the "result from" language, and no second layer of proof was ever intended under the liability provisions. 246 It is a strict liability standard. Any other interpretation is invalid because the two-step evaluation requires a proximate causation standard that certainly was not intended by Congress.
Furthermore, because the court relied on the definitions provided in Taira Lynn to reach this two-step conclusion, it is also relying on Gatlin. As noted previously, Gatlin sets dangerous precedent that highlights and favors the discharge or threatened discharge of oil over the incident, i.e. occurrences that precipitated the discharge, going so far as to only compensate the company for the oil that reached navigable waters. 247 Once again, future polluters could easily use this to mean that they are only responsible for those damages that arise from oil touching and damaging natural resources. Again, this directly contravenes Congress' intent to compensate those who suffer economic losses -an intention that does not require the two-step proximate cause showing championed by Gatlin, Taira Lynn, Professor Goldberg, and the In re Gulf Oil Spill court. Thus, despite the fact that the court did not explicitly address the causation issue under OPA, it still implicitly read the incorrect causation standard-proximate causation-into the liability provisions.
Such an improper reading is not surprising, given that the Fifth Circuit, as John Costonis noted, has a "self-confessed instinct for the 'reflexive invocation of admiralty jurisdiction,'" which demands such a proximate causation standard.
248 Unlike traditional maritime law, which is almost entirely judge-made, OPA provides a statutory remedy designed to work with regulations. Costonis notes "OPA's compensation and liability provisions are intricately crafted to pair with a command and control regulatory program on the one side, and a variety of civil and criminal fines and penalties on the other."
249 It leaves little room for judges to construct rules and remedies to fill what they perceive as interstitial gaps in the statute. Costonis is concerned that the BI Bundle ruling, prior to, and ultimately affecting the outcome of the Moratorium claims, "aggressively carves out an independent, parallel track, coequal with OPA, for a maritime regime that addresses the same question to which OPA speaks, but in a different and pervasively incompatible manner." 250 This incompatible manner is self-evident in the court's reading of the liability provisions, creating a maritime-esque, two-step proximate causation standard.
While there are certainly instances in which the court has a duty to fill gaps in Congress' lawmaking, the comprehensive nature and . In a two-part series, Costonis lays out the reasons why the BI Bundle ruling preserving federal maritime is incorrect and incompatible with an accurate reading of OPA. Because the BI Bundle left many of the traditional maritime law negligence tort remedies for economic and property losses intact, it allowed the court to fill perceived gaps with maritime theory rather than adhering to OPA's already comprehensive liability scheme when deciding the Moratorium claims. 252 However, the actual purpose "is to determine Congress' intent, not to make a fetish of one or more of these labels, as BI Bundle does, by exiling OPA to a non-displacement no-man's-land somewhere between 'occupation of an entire field' and 'speaking directly' to some particular feature of the maritime tort." 253 In short, a court should not attempt to shoehorn a mangled version of maritime law into a statute designed to replace a "'fragmented collection of Federal and State laws' with a 'single Federal law providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution. '" 254 When the incompatible maritime track is set aside and OPA's liability provisions are read correctly, plaintiffs are able to recover the economic losses suffered because of the Moratorium. After advancing a proximate causation standard, the court candidly states, " [t] here can be no doubt that the Government would not have imposed the Moratorium had the HORIZON/Macondo blowout and oil spill not occurred." 255 In effect, it admits causation. However, it then incorrectly parses the words of the Moratorium and emphasizes the Secretary's concern for the "possible future blowouts and oil spills from wells other than Macondo."
256 It states that "the perceived threats of discharge from other wells are different OPA 'incidents' (if these are OPA incidents at all) than the HORIZON/Macondo incident for which BP is a responsible party." 257 When analyzing the Moratorium, the court uses the incorrect two-step proximate causation standard, thereby denying the Moratoria plaintiffs their recovery. It incorrectly uses the "result from" language to find that the Moratorium did not result from the incident, and following this conclusion, brushes aside the plaintiff's valid claims. In direct contradiction of its own definition of liability, namely that there must be damage to natural resources, it states:
In OPA terms, then -and putting aside the question of whether 'plaintiffs' claims are due to the injury, destruction, or loss of property or natural resources -the OPA Test Case Plaintiffs' losses did not result from the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil from the Macondo Well: the resulted from the perceived threat (whether substantial or not) of discharge from other wells.
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Once again, the liability provisions of OPA contemplate damages that "result from such incident," 259 where "incident" is defined as "any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil." 260 The incident is not defined by the discharge; the discharge is defined by the incident. The incident is the series of occurrences leading up to the discharge or threat of discharge-the actual punishable actions of the responsible party. 261 To read it as the former would once again create a narrow loophole for possible responsible parties to avoid liability for wrongful actions were the discharge to precede the event. 262 The incident in the immediate case is the blowout, explosion, subsequent fire, and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, which most certainly resulted in the discharge of oil. The Moratorium was issued as a result of this incident, and the court itself concedes this. 263 Regardless of whether or not the Secretary enumerated other reasons for the Moratorium (namely that there were not enough response vessels in case of another spill and there was general concern for the safety practices of the industry 264 ), the fact remains that the Moratorium resulted from the incident, i.e. the blowout, explosion, subsequent fire and sinking of Deepwater 258. Id. If read together, it seems the court only intends for the true definition of "incident" to be considered in the first step of its analysis. It then changes the definition to mean only the discharge in the second step, precluding recovery by the Plaintiffs. It has written itself in circles, creating an unintelligible liability standard.
259 Horizon. 265 All of the Secretary's enumerated reasons for the Moratorium originate from the blowout.
The Coast Guard declared the Deepwater Horizon disaster a "Spill of National Significance" under the National Contingency Plan, the first in U.S. history. 266 Such a spill may be declared when it is "so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party resources to contain and clean up the discharge." 267 It is no wonder then that the Secretary had concerns about the number of response vessels necessary to attend to the Deepwater Horizon, leaving serious gaps in the resources available to respond to other spills. But it is clear that the response vessels were all deployed as a result of the incident. The declaration of the Spill of National Significance requiring an unprecedented amount of response resources and the resulting concern that there were not enough resources to address another spill in the Gulf were results of the incident. Further still, the "perceived weakness of industry-wide safety measures," 268 was not perceived until the incident occurred and, as such, is a result of the incident. In sum, and in the words of Judge Barbier, " [t] here can be no doubt that the Government would not have imposed the Moratorium [with all of its enumerated factors] had the HORIZON/Macondo blowout and oil spill not occurred." 269 BP proffered a number of dubious arguments as to why the Moratorium was not a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident. 270 However, given the lengthy analysis provided by this article, it is clear that none of them are viable under OPA. Despite this, the court, without any plausible statutory explanation, 271 accepted many of them as true and dismissed the economic claims of many deserving plaintiffs. Generally, BP's ultimate argument was that there was some sort of blanket Moratorium defense.
272 Such a defense directly contravenes the agreement by all parties involved that this issue, and OPA causation in general, is a fact-intensive inquiry. 273 To prove its blanket defense, BP argued that there was some sort of shift of responsibility to a third party i.e. the United States government, or that this was a superseding cause, which is generally reserved for proximate causation arguments. 274 The Plaintiffs highlight the impropriety of considering third party decisions in assessing causation:
Yet, taking BP's current arguments to their logical conclusion, none of these [economic damage] plaintiffs would arguably be entitled to recover: The Government makes deliberate decisions about which areas are closed to commercial fishermen; tourists and other travelers ultimately decide whether they will make or cancel travel plans; hotel operators decide whether they will lay off employees, cut hours, or reduce wages; the Coast Guard makes deliberate decisions about whether to suspend navigation on a river; and different potential purchasers are motivated by numerous considerations when they decide whether, where, and at what price to buy or lease property, frequent restaurants, or obtain new furniture.
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The suggested shift precludes all factual inquiry into the fault of BP. As noted above, the government negligence exception found in the CWA was not included in OPA and therefore cannot be invoked here. In addition, the very strict defenses to liability require that fault be placed entirely on a third party: an act of God or a war. 276 None of these defenses could be, let alone actually were, proved by BP.
One manifestation of the blanket Moratorium defense was BP's argument that the "Moratorium was not an unavoidable mandatory response to the oil spill, but instead newly crafted measures designed to facilitate an industry-wide review of drilling practices and, therefore, discretionary acts aimed at avoiding future spills." 277 As previously noted, the Moratorium and its enumerated reasons for existence were all a result of the incident. Further still, nowhere in the statute does it state that the response actions of the government must be "unavoidable" or "mandatory." BP is once again grafting requirements into the statute beyond what Congress intended. In fact, the Moratorium fits well within the definition of "remove" or "removal" found in § 2701(30). As discussed previously, under § 2701(30), "remove" or "removal" includes not only the physical containment and removal of oil, but also the "taking of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to public health or welfare." 278 Therefore, the Moratorium falls under the definition of "remove" or" removal," for it was a step taken to minimize or mitigate damage to public health or welfare, namely through prevention of another spill and addressing industry wide safety issues brought to light by the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill. Ignoring the fact that the Moratorium fits within the definition of "removal" under OPA, the court also distinguishes it from the "shutdown cases," cited by the Plaintiffs, specifically (and only) Dunham-Price. As discussed above, Dunham-Price and the rest of the shutdown cases are analogous to the Moratorium situation. 279 These shutdowns were the result of cleanup efforts, which include removal measures. The court states, with no explanation, that "[s]ignificantly, and unlike the Moratorium, the river closure was part of the effort to contain and clean up the spill from defendant's facility."
280 It is not clear how the Moratorium is significantly unlike "part of [an] effort to contain and clean up" the BP oil gushing into the Gulf at an alarming rate. The Moratorium itself notes that there were a record number of resources deployed to aid in this regard, which was part of the impetus for its issuance. 281 Moreover, the Moratorium, as an action considered necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, fits within the definition of "remove" or "removal." DunhamPrice emphasized the fact that the Calcasieu River, the closed body of water of concern, met OPA's definition of a natural resource, and its closure warrants the plaintiff's claims. 282 Furthermore, ACL notes that the Fifth Circuit has found triable issues of fact where "claimants seek damages for loss of business resulting from the closure or loss of use of a natural resource such as a river." 283 Thus, it is the closure of the resource, not the oiling, that courts consider significant; the incident rather than the discharge or threat of discharge is the key component of closure analysis. It is analogous to the claims of a fisherman: when he claims economic damage, it is not for the loss of oiled fish, but rather, his inability to access the fish. 284 Likewise, the Moratorium, has impeded the plaintiff companies from reaching or pursuing their business. In fact, even Professor Goldberg observed that "if a spill were to deprive commercial fishermen of expected profits by killing fish they ordinarily would catch and sell, or by causing authorities to bar the fishermen from accessing those fish for a period of time, the fishermen would be entitled to recover." 285 The Moratorium claims, like those of the fishermen, are far from remote. These plaintiffs were barred from accessing their trade as a result of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 286 The Moratorium is clearly a response to the spill, and resulted in the closure of a natural resource identically, save for its much larger scale, to the "shutdown cases."
The court highlights the fact that the Plaintiffs "assert that the Government has imposed drilling moratoria every year from 1982 through 2008, yet Plaintiffs cite no cases in which a private party has been held liable (under OPA or other law) for losses caused by a Moratorium." 287 It concludes that the absence of such cases indicates that the plaintiffs' claims are not recoverable. 288 Putting aside the fact that this logic flies in the face of our justice system, this Moratorium, like the oil spill it resulted from, is unique. Generally, moratoria are implemented for political, economic, and scientific reasons, often with international relations considerations. 289 The moratoria cited by the plaintiffs address political motives, but some did indeed follow oil spills. 290 However, the court incorrectly characterizes the lawsuits that followed. Because many of the spills cited by the plaintiffs pre-date OPA, a moratorium would not have been a triable issue. 291 For those that came after OPA's 1990 passage, at least two of the cited cases settled out of court, but not before finding that shutdown claims were triable under OPA's liability standard. 292 However, unlike these relatively small spills and closures, the BP Disaster and subsequent Moratorium is unprecedented in its size and scope. 293 Furthermore, as noted by the Secretary himself, this unique Moratorium was the direct result of the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
The argument that the Moratorium would have happened regardless of whether or not a spill occurred does not negate the fact that it resulted from the Deepwater Horizon blowout. This situation is analogous to the situation in Hyundai, where Hyundai argued that Coast Guard salaries do not fall under response and removal costs because they would have been paid regardless of whether or not they were responding to an OPA incident. 294 As discussed above, the court correctly held that such salaries did result from the incident, noting "[t]he fact that, if this near-disaster had not occurred, the personnel would have been paid to perform some other task does not alter the reality that the mishap did occur and the Coast Guard personnel were paid to monitor a potential spill."
295 Likewise, the fact that a moratorium would likely have occurred for different reasons does not change the fact that this specific Moratorium was a result of the incident; as such, the plaintiffs are entitled to their economic damages.
The fact that "the Coast Guard, as part of its administration of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, has denied claims that are 'a direct result of the moratorium, not a direct result of an oil discharge'" 296 has little bearing on whether or not the Moratorium resulted from the incident. 297 In fact, the Coast Guard, as noted above, has a tendency to interpret regulations in its favor and in such a way that hinders industry, regardless of whether or not industry claims are valid and compensable. 298 Unfortunately, it appears that the court is perpetuating the prejudice against the oil industry evidenced in Conoco, Hyundai, and Gatlin. 299 It makes very little sense and in fact directly disregards the purpose of statutory authority to read a statute differently based solely on who is bringing a claim.
IX. CONCLUSION
OPA is an important law that very plainly sought to alter the dynamics of any post-oil spill litigation. Indeed, its clear language was designed to induce potentially responsible parties to adhere to heighted standards of care to avoid spills. In the future, courts should aim to adhere to statutory cannon: "[i]n construing a statute, the court is 'guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [must] look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy. '" 300 The Oil Pollution Act's obvious policy, as iterated by numerous House and Senate reports, was to ensure that all those adversely affected by a catastrophic oil spill could recover. Its causation standard, as evidenced by its "result from" and "due to" language and illuminating "incident" definition, is not the two-step proximate causation standard championed by the court, but rather a nexus standard that fulfills Congress' intention to expand recovery beyond Robins and M/V TESTBANK. OPA was and remains driven by strong public policy. True public policy treats all claimants as equal. Inequitable application of OPA as is seen in Gatlin and the Moratorium claims flies in the face of such public policy and should not stand as precedent.
This ruling is not simply about the Moratorium; it is about setting dangerous precedent in the Fifth Circuit that has the ability to create loopholes for responsible parties, narrow the recovery gap, and reinstate the Robins and M/V TESTBANK rule that Congress sought to supersede in enacting OPA. On August 10, 2016, the parties to the Moratorium case stipulated to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's appeal. 301 As such, the court's narrow interpretation of OPA and inadvertent inclusion of a two-step proximate causation standard is now precedent. The Fifth Circuit, situated in offshore oil country, is arguably faced with more significant OPA claims than much of the country. Precedent that reads the statute narrowly and inadvertently creates loopholes will only serve to harm an already economically disadvantaged region that suffers repeatedly from industry accidents. 
